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DEBATE

JUDICIAL RECUSAL AT THE COURT
Later this month, all nine justices will be hearing oral argument on
the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
and deciding the outcome of the case. But should they? In Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Supreme Court held that a judge of the West
Virginia Supreme Court violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution when the judge failed to recuse himself from a case involving a
major campaign contributor. Many cheered the case’s outcome, but
Professor Ifill believes Caperton is an “ominous sign” that a majority of
the Court fails to understand how dangerous the appearance of impropriety is in the American judicial system. Professor Segall agrees
that the judicial recusal system needs reform, but he disagrees with
Professor Ifill over what amounts to an appearance of impropriety. As
the need for reform becomes more apparent in light of the constitutional challenges to the Affordable Care Act, Professor Ifill and Professor Segall disagree over whether Justice Thomas or Justice Kagan
ought to recuse themselves from the Court’s upcoming hearings.
Their various perspectives highlight the confusion of contemporary
recusal doctrine for America’s highest Court and make a strong case
that the Court must do a better job of clarifying when a Justice should
recuse him- or herself.
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OPENING STATEMENT
Justice and Appearance of Justice
SHERRILYN A. IFILL

†

Chief Justice Roberts’s 2011 State of the Judiciary address confirmed what many court watchers have long suspected: our Supreme
Court fails to appreciate and understand fully how the appearance of
bias among the Court’s Justices may increasingly undermine the legitimacy of the court’s decisionmaking and implicate the due process
rights of litigants who appear before the Court. See JOHN G. ROBERTS,
JR., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL J UDICIARY (2011) [hereinafter, ROBERTS , 2011 REPORT], available at http://www.supreme
court.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011yearendreport.pdf. An early clue
to the mindset of the Roberts-led Court on this issue came in 2009 in
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). In that case,
the Court held that a West Virginia Supreme Court justice’s refusal to
recuse himself from a case involving a litigant who had donated millions of dollars to secure the justice’s election violated the petitioner’s
due process rights. Id. at 2256-57, 2267.
Although many regarded Caperton as a positive statement by the
Court that judges must withdraw from cases in which their conduct
raises an appearance of bias, I took a more skeptical view. Caperton
could hardly be considered a resounding affirmation of the Court’s
commitment to ensuring both the fact and appearance of impartiality
in judicial decisionmaking. First, the decision was a narrow one. Only
a bare majority of the Justices thought that the West Virginia justice’s
decision to sit and hear a multi-million dollar case affecting the business interests of his benefactor raised due process questions. Second,
the majority opinion was a narrow one, with Justice Kennedy explain†

Sherrilyn Ifill is a professor at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law, where she has taught since 1993. Her scholarly work is focused on judicial selection and judicial impartiality. Her article, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606 (2002), appeared in
the Maryland Law Review in 2002. .In a blog post on Concurring Opinions earlier this
year, Professor Ifill responded to Chief Justice Roberts’s 2011 State of the Judiciary
remarks. See Sherrilyn Ifill’s The Chief Strikes Out, CONCURRING OPINIONS, http://www.
concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/01/sherrilyn-ifills-the-chief-strikes-out.html (last
visited Feb. 15, 2012). Professor Ifill is currently completing a book on race and Supreme Court confirmation hearings.
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ing over and over again that the holding was limited only to “extreme”
cases. Id. at 2265. More robust was the four-member dissenting opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, who opened with the charge
that the majority’s decision would “undermine rather than promote,”
the value of a “fair, independent, and impartial judiciary.” Id. at 2267
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). What comes through most powerfully in
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent is his deep skepticism about the prospect of compelling the recusal of a judge or Justice based on the appearance of bias. This skepticism is never more apparent than when
Chief Justice Roberts predicts at the conclusion of his dissent that
“opening the door to recusal claims under the Due Process Clause, for
an amorphous ‘probability of bias’ [standard] will . . . bring our judicial
system into underserved disrepute.” Id. at 2274 (quoting the majority).
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Caperton powerfully foreshadows his
resistance to entertaining calls for a more rigorous examination of Supreme Court recusal practice.
The requirement of judicial recusal is based on the constitutional
due process right of litigants to have their cases heard by an impartial
tribunal. As Justice Kennedy has remarked, “One of the very objects of
law is the impartiality of its judges in fact and appearance.” Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 558 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, a federal judge or Justice must withdraw from a
cases in which his or her “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). The standard is an objective one,
and requires that a judge consider the question not from his or her
own perspective, but from the perspective of a reasonable person
knowing the facts. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. United States, Order
Denying Appeal, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302-03 (2000) (statement of
Rehnquist, C.J.). The Supreme Court has directed that, in assessing
claims raised under § 455(a), the focus “is not the reality of bias or
prejudice, but its appearance.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548 (majority opinion). The appearance standard set out in § 455(a) is consistent with
the Court’s determination over sixty years ago that “justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14
(1954). The connection between the constitutional due process right
of litigants and the appearance of bias standard expressed in § 455(a)
is precisely the standard that Chief Justice Roberts in Caperton seems to
regard as a threat to the judicial system.
Ironically, several years before finding that no constitutional question was raised by the participation of the West Virginia justice in a
case involving the state justice’s benefactor, Chief Justice Roberts iden-
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tified a circumstance in which, in his view, money paid to judges might
raise constitutional issues. In one of his earliest State of the Judiciary
reports, Chief Justice Roberts warned that Congress’s failure to increase
the pay of Article III judges had risen to the level of a “constitutional issue.” JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2007), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2006year-endreport.pdf. Roberts did not identify which aspect of
the Constitution is threatened by the admittedly inadequate pay afforded federal judges. It is difficult to see how Congress’s failure to
increase federal judicial salaries to a competitive market level can raise
a constitutional crisis, while the refusal of a judge to disqualify himself
from hearing a case affecting a party who donated millions of dollars
to securing his judgeship does not. But such is the reasoning of our
Chief Justice on this issue.
In his latest report, Chief Justice Roberts attempted to take on the
range of emerging critiques that go to the ethical conduct of the Justices. First, he responded to arguments that the Justices should be
bound by the Code of Judicial Conduct. ROBERTS, 2011 REPORT, supra,
at 2-5. He correctly argued that the Code, by its own terms, does not
apply to the Supreme Court. Id. at 3. It was a bit startling, however, for
the Chief Justice to offer, as an explanation for why the Justices need
not even voluntarily bind themselves to the standards set out in the
Code, the fact that the Justices “may” consult a variety of sources to
guide their ethical conduct. Id. at 5.
Of course the Justices “may” consult a variety of sources. But do
they? Are the sources set out in the Chief Justice’s remarks—judicial
opinions, treatises, scholarly articles, and disciplinary decisions—
consulted by all of the Justices? The Chief Justice himself remarked
last year that he does not read law review articles. See John G. Roberts,
Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Remarks at the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals Seventy-Seventh Annual Judicial Conference
(June 25, 2011). Should we presume that the inclusion of scholarly
articles in the list of sources that Justices may consult on ethical questions is merely theoretical? Is there any uniform practice to which the
Justices adhere? In sum, Chief Justice Roberts’s response gave very
little new insight into how the Justices actually approach ethical issues.
More important and detailed was Chief Justice Roberts’s effort to
respond comprehensively to calls that Justices Kagan and Thomas
should each withdraw from hearing the constitutional challenge to the
health care law that the Court will hear this Term. At issue was the
obligation imposed on all federal judges by 28 U.S.C. § 455.
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In my view, the case for Justice Thomas’s recusal is considerably
more compelling than that for Justice Kagan. Justice Thomas’s wife,
Virginia Lamp Thomas, has led a Tea Party-affiliated lobbying group
that has made the health care law a central target of its work. See Jeffrey
Toobin, Partners, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2011, at 40, 41. At an event
last year, Justice Thomas reportedly made remarks that suggest his endorsement of his wife’s political activities, describing her creation of
the organization as working “in defense of liberty” and “defending
. . . [the] Constitution.” Id. at 48.
Concerns about Justice Kagan’s impartiality arise largely from
whether, as Solicitor General in the Obama Administration, she may
have been involved in providing advice to members of the Administration on the soundness or constitutionality of the health care law. See Eric
Segall, A Liberal’s Lament on Kagan and Health Care, SLATE (Dec. 8, 2011,
4:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurispru
dence/2011/12/obamacare_and_the_supreme_court_should_elena_ka
gan_recuse_herself_.html. The evidence is largely limited to an email
that then–Solicitor General Kagan sent to a colleague after learning of
the passage of the health care legislation. In the email, Kagan remarks, “I hear they have the votes . . . . Simply amazing!” Id. Marveling at the fact that the controversial bill garnered sufficient votes to
pass hardly seems to rise to the level needed for recusal, but it is certainly fair to ask questions about how involved Kagan may have
been in providing counsel to members of the Administration in fashioning the health care law.
In sum, both Justices have been the subjects of legitimate questions
about whether they engaged in conduct that raises the appearance of
bias and should preclude their participation in deliberations about the
health care bill. Of course, the Justices themselves know more than we
do about their private conduct and their public statements or involvement with advocates working for or against the legislation. That’s
why the appropriate process for determining whether Justices Kagan
and Thomas should recuse themselves requires each Justice to engage
in an objective analysis. Chief Justice Roberts acknowledges this in his
State of the Judiciary report. He notes that the “individual Justices
decide for themselves whether recusal is warranted under Section
455.” ROBERTS, 2011 REPORT, supra, at 8. But having set out the appropriate approach to a recusal determination, he then preempts the
individual recusal consideration by offering encomiums to the integrity, impartiality, and professionalism of his colleagues and painstakingly
emphasizing why Supreme Court Justices should refrain from liberally
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acceding to recusal. One might even argue that the timing and substance of the Chief Justice’s statement implicitly warns off litigants
from using § 455 to seek either Justice Thomas or Justice Kagan’s
recusal in the health care litigation.
Thus, while no doubt hoping to clarify and elucidate the Court’s
approach to recusal, and seeking to quell criticism of the Court’s practices in this area, Chief Justice Roberts’s State of the Judiciary report
may raise more concerns than it allays.
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts’s statement fails to address the set
of concerns that goes to the heart of the Court’s recusal practices.
The stunning lack of transparency in these practices remains unchanged, and leaves litigants and the public largely unable to understand, track, or assess how or whether the Court’s recusal
determinations adhere to the letter and spirit of the statute. Chief Justice Roberts’s assurances that the impartiality of his colleagues on the
Court is unassailable will allay neither the public’s sense of disquiet
nor the confusion of litigants, who have few guidelines to assist them
in making the important decision about whether to seek the recusal of
a Supreme Court Justice. The public and litigants before the Court
would benefit from concrete practices that increase transparency. For
example, Chief Justice Roberts could ask that his colleagues regularly
issue decisions—however brief—explaining their decision of whether
to recuse themselves in cases in which recusal motions are filed. This
is a small step, but it would vastly improve current practice, in which
recusal decisions are a rarity.
One hopes that Chief Justice Roberts will, perhaps through the Judicial Conference, demonstrate a willingness to engage further with
the profession on how to improve the Court’s recusal practices.
Transparency will strengthen the public’s confidence in the Court
and will better position litigants to protect their constitutional right
to have their cases heard by a Court that satisfies both the fact and
appearance of impartiality.
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REBUTTAL
Supreme Court Recusal, the Affordable Care Act, and the Rule of Law
ERIC J. SEGALL

†

Professor Ifill has written a thoughtful and interesting Opening
Statement concerning the recusal and ethical practices of Supreme Court
Justices, whether Justices Kagan and Thomas should recuse themselves
from the litigation over the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and the importance of Chief Justice Roberts’s 2011 year-end report in addressing
these issues. See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf. Our areas of agreement
easily outweigh our disagreements. For example, I agree with Professor Ifill that the Justices need to be more transparent about their
recusal decisions, that the Justices should voluntarily agree to be
bound by the same ethical rules that apply to lower court judges, and
that the Chief Justice’s report was dissatisfying, question-begging, and
at least a little bit arrogant. His calls for the American public and those
litigating before the Court to trust that the Justices will act appropriately
when considering recusal and ethical issues smack of hubris.
Where Professor Ifill and I disagree is over the relative cases for
recusal of Justices Thomas and Kagan in the health care litigation.
Professor Ifill believes that the case “for Justice Thomas’s recusal is
considerably more compelling than that for Justice Kagan.” Professor
Ifill argues that Justice Thomas’s wife created a lobbying group that
“made the health care law a central target of its work,” and that Justice
Thomas himself seemed to endorse those activities at a public event last
year. Those facts, according to Professor Ifill, suggest that Justice
Thomas’s impartiality in the case could reasonably be questioned.
Questions about Justice Kagan’s recusal stem from her possible involvement with the health care issue while she was the Solicitor General in the Obama Administration, and the email exchange with
Laurence Tribe—at the time a legal advisor to the Administration—in
which she said “I hear they have the votes, Larry!! Simply amazing.”
See Eric Segall, A Liberal’s Lament on Kagan and Health Care, SLATE (Dec.
8, 2011, 4:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
†

Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Professor Segall is the
author of SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT I S NOT A COURT AND I TS JUSTICES A RE NOT J UDGES , and can be followed on Twitter at @espinsegall.
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jurisprudence/2011/12/obamacare_and_the_supreme_court_should_
elena_kagan_recuse_herself_.html. Professor Ifill suggests that these
facts probably do not support recusal, though she concedes that reasonable questions about Justice Kagan’s involvement with the ACA
could and perhaps should be asked.
I think, when all the facts are considered, Professor Ifill understates
the reasons Justice Kagan should recuse herself from the ACA litigation and overstates the need for Justice Thomas to recuse. First, as to
Justice Kagan, the case for her recusal is strong because of a “perfect
storm” of events that are unlikely to repeat themselves again: (1) she
was the Solicitor General of the United States when the ACA was furiously debated in Congress and town halls across the country; (2) the
ACA is the most controversial and partisan piece of legislation that the
Obama Administration has put forward; (3) she was nominated to the
Court by President Obama shortly after Congress enacted the ACA;
(4) the Court will review the ACA just a few months before President
Obama runs for reelection; (5) the President’s reelection might well
be affected by how the Supreme Court rules; (6) she celebrated the
passage of the ACA over email with Professor Tribe; and, (7) both her
Office and her Deputy, Neil Katyal, were involved in the Obama Administration’s litigation strategy in the lower federal courts on the issue
of the ACA’s constitutionality. Segall, supra.
Federal law requires Supreme Court Justices to recuse themselves if
their “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” or if the Justice
previously served in governmental employment and in that capacity
“participated as counsel, adviser, or material witness concerning the
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)–(b) (2006). Under these standards,
there is no question that Katyal would have had to recuse himself had
he been appointed to the Court. He was a counselor and adviser on
the issue and, once having served in that capacity, his “impartiality”
could and would be “questioned.”
Katyal was working directly for Kagan, and publicly available documents show that he informed her that the Solicitor General’s Office
would be involved in the health care litigation in the lower courts—
not a common occurrence for that office. See Terence P. Jeffrey, Kagan
to Tribe on Day Obamacare Passed: “I Hear They Have the Votes,
Larry!! Simply Amazing,” CNSNEWS.COM (Nov. 10, 2011), http://
cnsnews.com/news/article/kagan-tribe-day-obamacare-passed-i-hear-theyhave-votes-larry-simply-amazing. It simply does not make sense, nor is
it good policy, to suggest that the Solicitor General of the United States
does not have to recuse herself from a case her Office worked on be-
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cause she decided to have no personal contact with the case. In other
words, even if Kagan was not technically a “counselor” or “adviser” on
the issue, what possible motivation would she have for creating a firewall on this issue between herself and the rest of her office, or in fact
the whole Administration? What explanation could she offer to justify
the firewall that would not raise questions about her “impartiality” on
this issue? It would be an odd rule that the head of a United States
agency could avoid future recusals by intentionally staying away from
an explosive legal issue in anticipation of being asked to serve on the
Supreme Court by a President with an enormous stake in that particular issue. It must also be remembered that, as far as we know, the only
case Justice Kagan intentionally stayed away from while serving as the
Solicitor General was the ACA litigation. In her first Term, she
recused herself from twenty-five of the first fifty-one cases before the
Court. Robert Barnes, Recusals Could Force Newest Justice to Miss Many
Cases, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2010, at A15. Why did she work on those
cases but not the ACA litigation?
One way to test my hypothesis about Justice Kagan is to imagine what
would happen if the Justices were to vote 5-4 to uphold the ACA, with
Justice Kennedy siding with the moderate-liberal wing against the four
conservatives. Justice Kennedy, as the senior Justice in the majority,
would decide who would write the opinion, but it would be extremely
unlikely that he would ask Justice Kagan to do so. Thinking about the
reasons why, the case for Justice Kagan’s recusal becomes clearer.
The Supreme Court is, of course, a political institution, and its decisions usually reflect the Justices’ values. Nothing in this Rebuttal
suggests that the Justices should recuse themselves simply because they
have strong political connections to the administration in power or
preexisting substantive views about the issues before the Court. We
knew how Justices Scalia and Alito felt about abortion before they were
on the Court—and the same for Justices Ginsburg and Breyer—but
that does not mean they should have recused themselves from abortion cases. And many Supreme Court Justices have resolved issues important to the Presidents who appointed them. But, we do not have a
prior case in which a Justice had to resolve a constitutional issue so
important to a President running for reelection who appointed that
Justice, and where the Justice herself headed a federal agency involved
in that very litigation. I am more than willing to say that, if all those
things happen again, that future Justice should not hear the case.
Justice Thomas, however, is a different matter. The calls for his
recusal stem mostly from his wife’s past activities lobbying against the

IfillSegall Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)3/30/2012 6:16 PM

340 University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra

[Vol. 160: 331

ACA, and her making money by doing so, as well as a public statement
Justice Thomas made approving of his wife’s political activities. I believe that requiring recusal because of a spouse’s involvement with an
issue, absent a current financial stake in the controversy, is a dangerous precedent. For example, the wife of Judge Reinhardt, who recently
wrote the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the Proposition 8 litigation,
worked for the ACLU in a leadership capacity for many years and publicly spoke out in favor of same-sex marriage (and maybe even had
some contact with the plaintiffs’ attorneys in the case). See Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2011) (denying recusal
motion); see also Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL
372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (merits opinion). I do not think, however, and neither apparently do any liberals, that Judge Reinhardt
needed to recuse himself for those reasons. In his order denying the
recusal motion, Judge Reinhardt said that
my wife and I share many fundamental interests by virtue of our marriage,
but her views regarding issues of public significance are her own, and cannot be imputed to me, no matter how prominently she expresses
them. . . . Because my wife is an independent woman, I cannot accept Proponents’ position that my impartiality might reasonably be questioned
. . . because of her opinions or the views of the organization she heads.

Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d at 912.
There could come a point where a Justice’s spouse is so closely
identified with current litigation that their relationship would require
recusal, but absent a direct financial stake, it is fair to assume that
judges and Justices will decide cases without regard to spousal pressure. A different rule would be difficult to implement and would
greatly limit what careers spouses of judges could pursue.
The recusal issues pertaining to Justices Thomas and Kagan do
have one thing in common, and here again Professor Ifill and I are in
complete agreement. Given the importance of the litigation—
politically, legally, and for the future of health care in this country—
and the proximity of the case to a presidential election, both Justices
should provide a public statement explaining their reasons for not
recusing themselves. As Professor Ifill said so well, “Transparency will
strengthen the public’s confidence in the Court and will better position
litigants to protect their constitutional right to have their cases heard by
a Court that satisfies both the fact and appearance of impartiality.”
Court commentators have resoundingly criticized Justice Roberts’s
implicit defense in his year-end report of the Justices’ silence on these
issues. See, e.g., Andrew Kreig, Chief Justice’s Report Ducks Ethics Scandals,
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JUST INTEGRITY PROJECT, http://justiceintegrity.org/index.php?
otion=com_content&view=article&id=533&catid=44&sectionid=1&Ite
mid=1 (last visited Feb. 15, 2012); Mike Sacks, Chief Justice Roberts’ Defense Of Supreme Court Ethics Doesn’t Soothe Critics, HUFFPOST POLITICS
(Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/05/chiefjustice-john-roberts-supreme-court-ethics_n_1184780.html. There are
nonfrivolous reasons for suggesting recusal, and the Justices would
further the rule of law by explaining their decisions to stay on the case.
Their failure to do so further removes the Court from the American
people and will make it much easier for the losing side to argue that
the eventual decision resulted more from political and partisan concerns than from good-faith legal analysis.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
To Recuse or Not to Recuse? The Need for Standards
SHERRILYN A. IFILL
Professor Segall raises compelling and important questions about
Justice Kagan’s impartiality based on her involvement or—if I am reading his Rebuttal correctly—her perhaps deliberate noninvolvement in
discussions surrounding the constitutionality of the developing health
care legislation during the time she served as Solicitor General. I suppose that the Solicitor General’s deliberate decision not to involve
herself with Administration-backed legislation based on the expectation that she would be nominated to the Supreme Court in the near
future could raise questions about her impartiality, but it seems like a
stretch—more the stuff of conspiracy theory than reasonable question.
But as Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Laird v. Tatum, the Justice facing a recusal motion is in the best position to know all of the facts.
Order Denying Recusal Motion, 409 U.S. 824, 824 n.1 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). Professor Segall rightly argues that an opinion from Justice Kagan could shed light on the motivation
for her arms-length stance from the health care legislation during
her time as Solicitor General.
With regard to Justice Thomas’s support of the work of his wife
Ginni Thomas, the comparison to Ninth Circuit Judge Reinhardt in
the Proposition 8 case does not change my view. Mrs. Reinhardt’s
work in the leadership of the ACLU and her public support of samesex marriage hardly compares to the political activity and inflammatory
public statements that have been Ginni Thomas’s near-exclusive focus
for the past two years. For example, I would not argue that Mrs.
Thomas’s work for the Heritage Foundation raises questions about
Justice Thomas’s impartiality in cases involving affirmative action, gun
rights, or other issues on which that organization has staked out clear
positions. However, Mrs. Thomas’s formation of Liberty Central was
motivated, developed, and focused almost exclusively on what she and
her supporters regard as the “tyrannical” passage of the health care
legislation. Mrs. Thomas reportedly suggested that the law was “unconstitutional.” Kathleen Hennessey & David G. Savage, Justice’s Wife
Seeks Repeal of Healthcare Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at A9. And in
one interview, she called it a “corrupt . . . power grab.” Power Player of
the Week: Ginni Thomas (Fox News television broadcast May 23, 2010),
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available at http://www.libertycentral.org/news/ginni-thomas-talks-aboutliberty-central-2/. Justice Thomas’s statements last year in support of
his wife’s work “in defense of liberty” thus appear to be specifically directed at her activism in opposition to the health care bill. Jeffrey
Toobin, Partners, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2011, at 40, 48.
Moreover, it is the Court itself that makes the argument that Supreme Court Justices are like no other federal judge. Chief Justice
Roberts claims that since Justices cannot be replaced, they should not
recuse themselves from cases unless absolutely necessary. See JOHN G.
ROBERTS, JR., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9
(2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2011year-endreport.pdf. But isn’t this characteristic also the reason that Supreme Court Justices should hold themselves to a higher
standard of conduct? Mrs. Thomas is not in the same position as Mrs.
Reinhardt or former Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, who was married to Third Circuit Court of Appeals judge Marjorie O. Rendell for
forty years. Her husband is a Justice of the one court explicitly created
by the Constitution and in which the federal government’s judicial
power is vested. I am not arguing that Mrs. Thomas should give up
her free speech rights, but the consequence of her intemperate statements and targeted activism against the health care law may be that
her husband cannot decide the law’s constitutionality.
In any case, I would be greatly satisfied if Justice Thomas, like Judge
Reinhardt, would write an opinion explaining his decision not to recuse himself from hearing the case. It is not hard to imagine what Justice
Thomas would conclude, but his reasoning in presumably rejecting
recusal would help future litigants and the public understand how the
Justices view the issue of impartiality and the grounds for recusal.
Of course Professor Segall and I are at a significant disadvantage,
and our speculation only supports the point on which we both agree.
The Justices themselves are in the best position to know the facts
that underlie credible claims. Thus, when questions arise, especially in cases of great constitutional import, the Justices should respond with public opinions or statements explaining why they will
or will not recuse themselves.
In recently reviewing then–Justice Rehnquist’s statement supporting his refusal to withdraw from hearing Laird v. Tatum, I was struck
that he chose to issue a statement on recusal although “neither the
Court nor any Justice individually appears ever to have done so.” Order Denying Recusal Motion, 409 U.S. at 824. Thirty-two years later,
Justice Scalia emphasized a similar point when he criticized the Sierra
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Club for its inability to cite to relevant precedent to support its recusal
motion. He remarked:
When I learned that Sierra Club had filed a recusal motion in this case, I
assumed that the motion would be replete with citations of legal authority,
and would provide some instances of cases in which, because of activity
similar to what occurred here, Justices have recused themselves or at least
have been asked to do so.

Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., Order Denying Recusal Motion,
541 U.S. 913, 922 (2004) (memorandum of Scalia, J.). Talk about a
rock and hard place. Forty years after Laird and eight years after the
famous duck-hunting case involving the Sierra Club and Dick Cheney,
litigants seeking recusal of Supreme Court Justices remain in the same
position—unable to cite to Supreme Court precedent largely because
the Court refuses to issue written opinions explaining recusal decisions.
The solution is for Chief Justice Roberts and the other Justices to
issue a set of procedures governing their recusal practices. These procedures should be uniform and transparent. At a minimum, they
ought to require the Justices to issue recusal decisions in cases where
recusal motions have been filed. In some instances, these decisions
may be one- or two-line summary explanations. But in other cases, the
Justices—giving due regard to the weight of the concerns raised, the
high-profile nature of the case, factual inaccuracies circulating in the
public, and the potentially divisive nature of the case—should offer
detailed and clear explanations of their recusal decisions.
As I’ve said elsewhere, it is unfortunate that we seem to discuss the
issue of Supreme Court recusal practice only in the context of highprofile controversial cases. See The Diane Rehm Show: Conflict of Interest
on the Supreme Court (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 25, 2011), transcript
available at http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2011-08-25/conflictinterest-supreme-court/transcript. The issue is really not about who
should recuse themselves from hearing the challenge to the health
care law. At issue is a matter that threatens to erode the public’s belief
in the impartiality of our highest court. We have been grappling with
this concern at least since Justice Rehnquist’s now widely condemned
decision not to recuse himself from hearing Laird v. Tatum in 1972,
and the Court has still refused to develop a consistent, uniform, and
transparent recusal practice.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
Time for a Change: The Sorry Practice of Supreme Court Recusals
ERIC J. SEGALL
Professor Ifill and I are in complete agreement that Supreme Court
Justices need to “issue a set of procedures governing their recusal
practices. These procedures should be uniform and transparent. At a
minimum, they ought to require the Justices to issue recusal decisions
in cases where recusal motions have been filed. In some instances,
these decisions may be one- or two-line summary explanations. But in
other cases, the Justices . . . should offer detailed and clear explanations of their recusal decisions.”
Professor Ifill and I, however, remain in disagreement as to whether
Justices Thomas and Kagan should recuse themselves from the Affordable Care Act (ACA) litigation. As to Justice Thomas, Professor Ifill
points to Mrs. Thomas’s activities with Liberty Central that were “motivated, developed, and focused almost exclusively on what she and her
supporters regard as the ‘tyrannical’ passage of the health care legislation.” Professor Ifill further points to general statements made by
Justice Thomas in support of his wife’s work defending liberty.
As I explained in my Rebuttal, and as Judge Reinhardt made clear
in his opinion denying recusal in the Proposition 8 litigation, it is dangerous business to ask judges and Justices to recuse themselves from
cases because of their spouse’s political activities. Why stop at spouses?
How about a child, a best friend, or a mother-in-law? Furthermore,
imputing to a judge the views of his or her spouse expresses an oldfashioned view of marriage and may deter spouses, most often women,
from pursuing important careers. If Judge Reinhardt’s wife is allowed
to work for the ACLU of Southern California and frequently espouse
the view that same-sex marriage is both desirable and constitutional,
without Judge Reinhardt recusing himself from the Proposition 8 litigation, then Ginni Thomas can certainly engage in political activities
opposed to the ACA without Justice Thomas having to recuse himself
from that case. Justice Thomas’s general and vague support of his
wife’s career does not change that calculus in any meaningful manner.
Justice Kagan, however, is in a significantly different situation. Professor Ifill summarizes my argument as centered on Kagan’s “perhaps
deliberate noninvolvement in discussions surrounding the constitutionality of the developing health care legislation during the time she
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served as Solicitor General.” Professor Ifill then argues that the “Solicitor General’s deliberate decision not to involve herself with Administration-backed legislation based on the expectation that she would be
nominated to the Supreme Court in the near future could raise questions about her impartiality, but it seems like a stretch—more the stuff
of conspiracy theory than reasonable question.”
Professor Ifill has misconstrued and understated my arguments for
Justice Kagan’s recusal. The relevant standards are whether Kagan
served as an “adviser” or “counsel” on the ACA litigation during her
governmental service or whether her “impartiality” could reasonably
be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006). On the day the bill was
passed, she permitted her Office to work on the case in the lower
courts against the Solicitor General’s normal policy of handling only
Supreme Court litigation. On that same day, she celebrated the passage of the ACA over email with Laurence Tribe. See Eric Segall, A Liberal’s Lament on Kagan and Health Care, SLATE (Dec. 8, 2011, 4:07 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/1
2/obamacare_and_the_supreme_court_should_elena_kagan_recuse_her
self_.html. Also on that day, apparently, she decided to remove herself
from the case during her remaining tenure as Solicitor General. Id. I
use the word “apparently” because the government has refused to turn
over documents pertaining to Kagan’s work on the case based on the
attorney work-product doctrine. Declaration of Valier H. Hall In Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 14-15, Media
Research Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 10-2013 (D.D.C. Mar. 15,
2011). To argue on one hand that Kagan was not an adviser or counselor on the case but to argue on the other hand that information regarding her participation in the case is protected by privileges normally
reserved for attorneys and their clients is highly suspect.
I am not suggesting that Justice Kagan has not told the truth about
her participation or lack thereof in the ACA litigation. I am arguing
that her Office’s direct involvement in the case, coupled with the assertion of the work product privilege in response to requests about her
participation, suggest that she should not sit on the case. A similar
rule has sometimes been applied to United States attorneys who became federal judges. These judges have not been allowed to preside
over cases on which their former offices worked, even if they had no
direct involvement, because the knowledge and acts of their assistants
are imputed to them. United States v. Arnpriester, 37 F.3d 466, 467
(9th Cir. 1994).
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A few weeks ago, Justice Kagan recused herself from a high-profile
affirmative action case involving the admissions policy of the University
of Texas. See Order Granting Petition for Certiorari, Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex., No. 11-345 (Feb. 21, 2012). She has also recused herself from
the important Arizona immigration case that the Supreme Court will
hear later this Term. See Order Granting Petition for Certiorari, Arizona
v. United States, No. 11-182 (Dec. 12, 2011).
In fact, Justice Kagan has recused herself from many cases over the
past two years. It appears that she decided not to work on only one
case while she was the Solicitor General—the ACA litigation.
What possible reason could she have for working on such high-profile
issues as immigration and affirmative action, as well as many other
cases, but not the ACA litigation? There is no plausible answer to
that question that obviates the need for Justice Kagan to recuse
herself from the case.
Professor Ifill and I have both bemoaned the Supreme Court’s appalling lack of standards and transparency when it comes to the Justices’
recusal decisions. Sadly, from the beginning of this country’s history,
Supreme Court Justices have decided cases that normal judges would
never hear. Chief Justice Marshall decided Marbury v. Madison, despite
the fact that he and his brother were partly to blame for the plaintiff’s
injury in the case. Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)constitutionality of Supreme
Court Recusal Standards, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1202-03. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes presided over cases that he had previously heard as a
judge in Massachusetts, Justice Black ruled on the constitutionality of a
federal law that he helped draft, and Justice Rehnquist declined to
recuse himself from a case involving a federal law he worked on during his time in the Nixon Administration. Id. at 1203-04. These are all
unfortunate examples of Supreme Court Justices acting improperly
and without integrity. Justice Kagan can either choose to continue this
sorry history, or to do the right thing and recuse herself from the ACA
litigation. Needless to say, I am not holding my breath for the latter.
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